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Abstract
In recent years, co-saliency object detection (CoSOD) has
achieved significant progress and played a key role in the
retrieval-related tasks, e.g., image retrieval and video fore-
ground detection. Nevertheless, it also inevitably posts a to-
tally new safety and security problem, i.e., how to prevent
high-profile and personal-sensitive contents from being ex-
tracted by the powerful CoSOD methods. In this paper, we
address this problem from the perspective of adversarial at-
tack and identify a novel task, i.e., adversarial co-saliency
attack: given an image selected from an image group contain-
ing some common and salient objects, how to generate an ad-
versarial version that can mislead CoSOD methods to predict
incorrect co-salient regions. Note that, compared with general
adversarial attacks for classification, this new task introduces
two extra challenges for existing whitebox adversarial noise
attacks: (1) low success rate due to the diverse appearance
of images in the image group; (2) low transferability across
CoSOD methods due to the considerable difference between
CoSOD pipelines. To address these challenges, we propose
the very first blackbox joint adversarial exposure & noise at-
tack (Jadena) where we jointly and locally tune the exposure
and additive perturbations of the image according to a newly
designed high-feature-level contrast-sensitive loss function.
Our method, without any information of the state-of-the-art
CoSOD methods, leads to significant performance degrada-
tion on various co-saliency detection datasets and make the
co-salient objects undetectable, which can be strongly practi-
cal in nowadays where large-scale personal photos are shared
on the internet and should be properly and securely preserved.
1 Introduction
Co-saliency is commonly referred to as the common and
salient (usually in foreground) visual stimulus residing in
a given image group. Co-saliency object detection (CoSOD)
therefore aims at detecting and highlighting the common and
salient foreground region (object) in the said image group
(Zhang et al. 2018). Different from the traditional single-
image saliency detection problem, the key to solving the co-
saliency problem is to discover the correspondence (based
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Figure 1: An overall of the novel problem and our solution. We ex-
pect the perturbed image to be undiscoverable in an even dynam-
ically growing group of images across multiple CoSOD methods,
which is much more challenging and practical in real-world sce-
narios. Note that, our attack is black-box and can be performed
without references provided in the group.
on various cues) for the common and similar salient re-
gion among multiple images in an image group. With un-
known semantic categories of the co-salient objects, the co-
saliency task is a rather challenging one, and a good co-
saliency detection algorithm should consider both the intra-
image saliency cues and the inter-image common saliency
cues (Fu, Cao, and Tu 2013).
At the moment, the co-saliency detection is still an emerg-
ing research direction, with many newly proposed methods
to solve this challenging problem. We will detail many of
the CoSOD algorithms ranging from low-level features to
high-level semantic features, as well as deep learning based
ones in Section 2. Co-saliency detection plays a key role
in many practical applications surrounding computer vision
and multimedia such as object co-segmentation (Zhu et al.
2016), foreground discovery in video sequences (Chang
et al. 2015), weakly supervised localization (Zhang et al.
2016), image retrieval (Fu, Cao, and Tu 2013), multi-camera
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surveillance (Luo et al. 2015), 3D object reconstruction from
2D images (Kar et al. 2015), etc.
However, the many existing powerful CoSOD methods
inevitably pose a fairly new safety and security problem, i.e.,
high-profile and personal-sensitive contents may be subject
to extraction and discovery by the CoSOD methods. In or-
der to prevent content-sensitive images from being discov-
ered by co-saliency detection, in this work, we address the
problem from the perspective of adversarial attack and iden-
tify a novel task, i.e., adversarial co-saliency attack that aims
at tackling the following scenario: given an image selected
from an image group containing some common and salient
objects, how to generate an adversarial version of the image
that can mislead CoSOD methods to predict incorrect co-
salient regions, thus evading the co-saliency detection and
making the images undiscoverable by the co-saliency detec-
tion algorithms.
It is worth noting that compared with general adversar-
ial attacks for classification, this new task introduces two
extra challenges for existing whitebox adversarial noise at-
tacks: (1) low success rate due to the diverse appearance
of images in the image group; (2) low transferability across
CoSOD methods due to the considerable difference between
CoSOD pipelines. To overcome these challenges, we pro-
pose the very first blackbox joint adversarial exposure &
noise attack (Jadena) where we jointly and locally tune the
exposure and additive perturbations of the image accord-
ing to a newly designed high-feature-level contrast-sensitive
loss function. Our method, without needing any informa-
tion of the state-of-the-art CoSOD methods, leads to signifi-
cant performance degradation on various co-saliency detec-
tion datasets and make the co-salient objects undetectable, as
shown in Fig. 1, which can be strongly practical in nowadays
where large-scale personal multimedia contents are shared
on the public domain Internet and should be properly and
securely preserved and protected from malicious extraction.
2 Related Work
In this section, we will introduce the related work of co-
saliency detection, adversarial attack, and adversarial attack
for saliency detection.
2.1 Co-saliency Detection
As an important branch of the saliency detection researches
(Achanta et al. 2009; Cheng et al. 2015; Li and Yu 2015,
2016; Wang et al. 2016; Qin et al. 2019; Song et al. 2020),
the mainstream co-saliency detection problem aims to de-
tect the common/similar salient objects in a group of multi-
ple images (Yu et al. 2018; Jiang et al. 2019; Li et al. 2019;
Zhang et al. 2020c,a; Zha et al. 2020). Co-saliency detection
not only considers the inter-image saliency cue but also the
inter-image common saliency cue (Fu, Cao, and Tu 2013; Ge
et al. 2016). Discovering the correspondence for the com-
mon/similar objects among multiple images is the key to the
co-saliency detection, which is solved by several optimiza-
tion based methods (Cao et al. 2014; Li et al. 2014), machine
learning based methods (Cheng et al. 2014; Zhang et al.
2015), and deep neural networks based methods (Zhang
et al. 2020c,a; Zha et al. 2020). In addition, other modal-
ity data like the depth image could be fused to improve the
RGB color image based co-saliency detection (Cong et al.
2018). Co-saliency detection has a lot of practical applica-
tions in computer vision and multimedia areas, such as the
co-segmentation (Jerripothula, Cai, and Yuan 2018) and co-
localization (Tang et al. 2014), that segments and localizes
the similar objects in a group of multiple images.
2.2 Adversarial Attack
As the booming development of deep neural networks, the
model safety attracts more and more attentions, therefore
many research works have been proposed for the adversar-
ial attack applied to the deep neural networks. Among these
works, several classical methods already show promising
results, such as the fast gradient signed method (FGSM)
(Goodfellow, Shlens, and Szegedy 2014), basic iterative
method (BIM) (Kurakin, Goodfellow, and Bengio 2016),
C&W method (Carlini and Wagner 2017), momentum it-
erative fast gradient sign method (MI-FGSM) (Dong et al.
2018), and so on. On one hand, most of current adversarial
attacks make efforts to learn an additive noise as a white-box
setting when the model parameters are given. For example,
the learnable noises will be added to the clean image as a
perturbation so as to drop the task performance. On the other
hand, some other researches try to simulate the perturbation
in the real-world applications with imperceptible human vi-
sual sense, such as the motion blur based attack (Guo et al.
2020b) and the watermark based attack (Jia et al. 2020). The
proposed method is different with these methods mentioned
above because it is a kind of non-additive-noise attack for
the black-box setting.
2.3 Adversarial Attack for Saliency Detection
Currently, there are not many research works of adversar-
ial attack and defense for the salient object detection. (Tran
et al. 2020) shows that adding adversarial attacks, e.g., using
FGSM (Goodfellow, Shlens, and Szegedy 2014), will result
in a significant performance drop in saliency detection, so
(Tran et al. 2020) proposed a method to clean data affected
by an adversarial attack. Different with image-space attacks,
(Che et al. 2019) proposed a sparser feature-space adversar-
ial perturbation against the deep saliency models that just re-
quires a part of model information. To the best of our knowl-
edge, this paper is the first work of the adversarial attack for
the co-saliency detection.
3 Methodology
3.1 Problem Formulation
Co-saliency object detection (CoSOD). Given a dynamic
image group I = {Ii} containing |I| images that have com-
mon and salient objects. The ‘dynamic’ means the image
group can be dynamically changed or extended since the
personal images are updated everyday in the real-world ap-
plications. A CoSOD method denoted as D(·) takes the im-
age group as input and outputs the common and salient re-
gions in all images
S = {Si}|I|i=1 = D(I), (1)
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where Si = D(I)[i] is a binary map of the i-th image to
represent its common and salient regions with ‘1’ and others
with ‘0’. Till now, there are numerous CoSOD methods that
have different pipelines and can realize effective co-saliency
detection.
Task definition. In this paper, we focus on a totally new
problem: given an image Ik from the dynamic image group
I with k ∈ [1, . . . , |I|], how to make it undiscoverable from
co-saliency object detection (CoSOD) methods. To solve
this problem, we formulate it as the adversarial attack: trans-
ferring the image Ik with adversarial perturbations to fool
a CoSOD method D(·) to predict an incorrect salient map,
i.e., Sk, for Ik. Specifically, we can add perturbations to the
original image Ik by Iak = Pθ(Ik) where I
a
k is the adversar-
ial example aiming to fool the CoSOD method and Pθ(Ik)
is a kind of image transformation (e.g., Pθ(Ik) = Ik + θ for
the popular additive-perturbation-based attack). The key for
the adversarial attack is how to calculate the parameter θ.
3.2 Adversarial Noise Attack and Challenges
We first consider a straightforward way to achieve the task
with the popular additive-perturbation-based attack. To be
specific, we define
Iak = Pθ(Ik) = Ik + θ, (2)
where θ is the pixel-wise perturbation having the same size
with Ik. Then, we can define the following objective func-
tion for calculating θ
arg max
θ
J(D({Ik + θ, Ii|i 6= k})[k],Sk),
subject to ‖θ‖p ≤ , (3)
where Sk is the CoSOD result of Ik based on the original
image group and J(·) is a loss function measuring the dis-
tance between the predictive results and Sk. The constraint
function, i.e., ‖θ‖p ≤ , is used to control the distortion de-
gree determined by θ.
We can optimize above function with the optimizations
for additive-perturbation-based attacks, i.e., one-step signed
gradient-based, iterative-based, and momentum-based opti-
mization methods. However, we find such general adversar-
ial noise attack cannot accomplish the new task very well
since it posts two challenges: ¶ it is hard for the white-
box adversarial noise attack to reach high attack success rate
since the dynamic image group I make the optimized θ in-
effective when new images are added. · since the diverse
pipelines of CoSOD the optimized θ has low transferability,
that is, the optimized θ based on one CoSOD method fails
to fool another one.
3.3 Joint Adversarial Exposure & Noise Attack
In this section, we introduce a new black-box attack method
that can address the two challenges that block the white-box
adversarial noise attack. In general, the saliency of an object
is related to the contrast to other regions of the input im-
age while the contrast is usualy affected by expoure that is a
common phenomenon during image capture. To realize ef-
fective co-saliency attack, incontrast to only cosidering the
noise in Sec. 3.2, we propose to jointly consider exposure
and noise factors during attack.
Formulation. We add the joint exposure&noise based per-
turbations to the image Ik by
Iak = Pθ(Ik) = θeIk + θn, (4)
where θ = [θe, θn] with θe and θn denote the pixel-wise
exposure and noise matrices, respectively. Note that, the
above exposure model has been widely used in various im-
age enhancement based methods (Fu et al. 2016; Zhang et al.
2020b). However, to realize effective co-saliency attack is
still challenging: ¶ exposure phenomenon is smooth across
the whole image domain and cannot be pixel-wise tuned like
the noise otherwise we would get speckle-like appearance.
· it is still unknown how to optimize these parameters to
achieve black-box attack across different CoSODs.
For the first challenge, we construct an objective function
to encourage the naturalness of the exposure. For the second
one, instead of optimizing θ based on a CoSOD method, we
explore a completely black-box way where we define the
objective functions on the high-level features extracted from
a pretrained classification model denoted as φ(·).
Objective function for naturalness of the adversarial ex-
posure. We emphasize that exposure in the real world is
usually smooth (i.e., neighboring pixels should have very
similar exposure) across the whole image. In contrast, the
adversarial attack requires the exposure to can be locally
different for high attack success rate. Besides, we want the
exposure should modify the original input as less as possi-
ble. To meet these requirements, we propose to represent
the exposure with the locally-variant multivariate polyno-
mial model in the logarithm domain and have
log(θe,p) =
D∑
d=0
D−d∑
l=0
ad,l(xp + up)
d(yp + vp)
l, (5)
where xp & yp are the coordinates of the p-th pixel. up & vp
denotes the variation offsets of the p-th pixel. {ad,l} denotes
the parameters of polynomial model and is concatenated as
a with D being the degree. Note that, the polynomial model
with fewer parameters {ad,l} leads to smoother exposure.
With Eq. 5, we can represent the exposure as the function
of a and the offset map U = {(up, vp)}, i.e., θe(a,U) .
More specific, to maintain the smoothness of exposure and
let it have the capability of adversarial attack, we define the
following objective function
Jsmooth(a,U) = −λb‖ log(θe(a,U))‖22 − λs‖∇U‖22, (6)
where the first term encourages to not perturb the original
image Ik and the second term is a total variation regulariza-
tion and encourages smooth variation of the exposure.
Objective function against single saliency. We argue that
the image Ik should be perturbed by the exposure and noise
to let its high-level features tend to be consistent across all
image regions. As a result, the salient objects would be not
invisible at high level. To this end, we define the objective
function against singe saliency
Jcons(a,U, θn) = −avg({std(φi(Pθ(Ik)))|i ∈ L}) (7)
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where φi(·) is the i-th layer feature of the CNN φ(·) and
L denotes the index set of employed layers. The function
std(·) calculates the standard variation of each feature chan-
nel and outputs the average of standard variations across all
channels. The function avg(·) computes the average of all
std(φi(Pθ(Ik))) across all required layers.
Objective function against co-saliency. Eq. 7 is set to
make the object less salient in a single image and may be
less effective for co-saliency detection since the non-salient
object could be salient again in an image group. We then ex-
tend Eq. 7 to the feature level of an image group, i.e.,Rwith
Pθ(Ik) ∈ R, and have
Jco-cons(a,U, θn) = −avg({std(Φi(R))|i ∈ L}), (8)
with Φi(R) = spl({φi(Ij)|Ij ∈ R}),
where we splice ith-layer features of all images in the R
with the function spl(·) in a channel-wise way. For example,
if the function φi(Ij) outputs a tensor with size 11×11×256
for four Ij in R, we can get Φi(R) with its size being
44 × 11 × 256. Intuitively, compared with Eq. 7, Eq. 8 is
to make the salient regions in Ik become less salient among
the image group R. Here, we consider two ways for con-
structingR. One uses the transformation of Ik, e.g., rotation
and up-down flip; Another employed some other images. We
will show that both could realize effective co-saliency attack.
Optimization. With above objective functions, we can
calculate the adversarial exposure (i.e., θe(a,U)) and noise
(i.e., θn) by optimazing
arg max
a,U,θn
Jco-cons/cons(a,U, θn) + Jsmooth(a,U),
subject to ‖θn‖p ≤ . (9)
Compared with the objective function used by adversarial
noise attack, i.e., Eq. 3, the new objective function has fol-
lowing advantages:¶ our objective function does not rely on
CoSOD methods or the networks they used. This means that
our method is a totally black-box attack and could be very
useful in the practical applications. · our method is totally
unsupervised since it does not use the predicted saliency
map i.e., Sk in Eq. 3, which also make it more useful in the
real world. ¸ we use the both exposure and noise for more
effective attack. We simply use the sign gradient descent al-
gorithm to optimize Eq. 9.
Algorithm. As shown in Fig. 2, our method takes a clean
image as input Ik. In addition to fetching references from
an image group, we design another approach, in which Ik
is augmented by flipping, mirroring, left rotation and right
rotation to generate four reference images. We collect the
original image and references together to consist R. Then,
we initialize coefficients a of exposure polynomial model,
offset map U and pixel-wise noise θn, all with zero values.
We will follow Eq. 4 and Eq. 5 to perturb the clean image.
Note that, only the original image Ik is perturbed, other than
the reference images. In the situation of initialization, the
perturbing is an identity operation. We employ a sign gradi-
ent descent algorithm to optimize Eq. 9, and MI-FGSM is
adopted in this paper. Finally, the optimized a,U and θn are
Optimizing Eq. 9
Res50
Initialization of exposure and noise
Figure 2: Pipeline of the joint adversarial exposure and noise at-
tack. Here shows how the clean image is augmented to generate
references by visualization and how the gradient back-propagates
along the blue dash lines.
applied to the original clean image, to generate a perturbed
image as output, which may fool CoSOD methods.
4 Experiments
In this section, we conduct groups of experiments to evalu-
ate our method and compare it with existing attacks. First,
we report the experimental settings in Sec. 4.1. Second, we
launch proposed attacks on several CoSOD benchmarks, ob-
serve how existing CoSOD methods are affected and per-
form ablation study to demonstrate the effectiveness of joint
perturbation in Sec. 4.2. Last, we compare with existing at-
tack methods on transferability and perceptibility in Sec. 4.3.
4.1 Experimental Setups
Datasets. In this paper, we conduct experiments on
Cosal2015 (Zhang et al. 2016), iCoseg (Batra et al. 2010),
CoSOD3k (Fan et al. 2020) and CoCA (Zhang et al. 2020c).
Cosal2015 and CoSOD3k are large-scale datasets, contain-
ing 2015 and 3316 images of 50 and 160 groups. iCoseg
contains 643 images of 38 groups, in which objects are in
the same scene within a group. CoCA is well-designed for
evaluating CoSOD method thanks to having multiple single
salient objects in each image, which contains 1295 images
of 80 groups.
Models. We involve three CoSOD models and one SOD
model for evaluating adversarial attacks. GICD (Zhang et al.
2020c) and GCAGC (Zhang et al. 2020a) are two state-of-
the-art CoSOD methods. We employ the GCAGC with an
HRNet backbone (Wang et al. 2019). PoolNet (Liu et al.
2019) is a CNN-based SOD method, but here we treat it
as a CoSOD method due to its competitive performance on
CoSOD datasets. CBCD is a traditional method for both
CoSOD and SOD, but we only adopt the co-saliency results
in this paper.
Metrics. In our experiments, we employ four metrics to
evaluate how adversarial attacks affect detection methods,
i.e., Average Precision (AP) (Zhang et al. 2018), F-measure
score Fβ with β2 = 0.3 (Achanta et al. 2009), Mean Abso-
lute Error (MAE) (Zhang et al. 2018) and Success Rate (S).
The first three metrics are widely used for CoSOD method
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GICD GCAGC CBCD PoolNet
S ↑ AP ↓ Fβ ↓ MAE ↑ S ↑ AP ↓ Fβ ↓ MAE ↑ S ↑ AP ↓ Fβ ↓ MAE ↑ S ↑ AP ↓ Fβ ↓ MAE ↑
C
os
al
20
15
Original 0.2352 0.8595 0.7800 0.0838 0.1881 0.8960 0.8275 0.0814 0.9504 0.6046 0.1530 0.2287 0.2625 0.8449 0.7626 0.1001
Jadenasingle 0.6864 0.7044 0.3831 0.1753 0.4868 0.7682 0.6162 0.1529 0.9663 0.5490 0.1199 0.2354 0.5538 0.6985 0.5152 0.1431
Jadenagroup 0.6849 0.7069 0.3838 0.1777 0.5221 0.7453 0.5842 0.1619 0.9826 0.5212 0.0715 0.2392 0.6060 0.6671 0.4650 0.1545
Jadenaaugment 0.6893 0.7016 0.3747 0.1749 0.5146 0.7432 0.5960 0.1592 0.9816 0.5137 0.0754 0.2394 0.6010 0.6648 0.4616 0.1513
Jedenaaugment w/o noise 0.3226 0.8297 0.7074 0.1037 0.2010 0.8860 0.8182 0.0870 0.9921 0.4853 0.0434 0.2422 0.3677 0.8032 0.6824 0.1145
Jedenaaugment w/o exposure 0.5261 0.7536 0.5483 0.1437 0.3821 0.8185 0.7074 0.1243 0.9533 0.6028 0.1473 0.2290 0.4303 0.7680 0.6347 0.1240
iC
os
eg
Original 0.2970 0.8189 0.7761 0.0851 0.1991 0.8721 0.8036 0.0788 0.7760 0.8005 0.4470 0.1744 0.2286 0.8845 0.7955 0.0709
Jadenasingle 0.6952 0.7063 0.4231 0.1666 0.3142 0.8369 0.7257 0.1111 0.8383 0.7422 0.3621 0.1849 0.5381 0.7677 0.5576 0.1346
Jadenagroup 0.6874 0.7070 0.4242 0.1663 0.3453 0.8167 0.7046 0.1166 0.9036 0.7073 0.2425 0.1979 0.5848 0.7474 0.4986 0.1450
Jadenaaugment 0.7092 0.7017 0.3966 0.1708 0.3733 0.8130 0.6989 0.1178 0.9051 0.7089 0.2324 0.1961 0.5785 0.7351 0.5002 0.1435
Jedenaaugment w/o noise 0.3997 0.7905 0.7171 0.1038 0.1975 0.8636 0.8015 0.0821 0.9425 0.6434 0.1361 0.2068 0.3515 0.8456 0.6965 0.0957
Jedenaaugment w/o exposure 0.5490 0.7525 0.5593 0.1406 0.2457 0.8626 0.7736 0.0919 0.7916 0.7998 0.4307 0.1750 0.3670 0.8405 0.7051 0.1020
C
oS
O
D
3k
Original 0.3555 0.7963 0.6981 0.0927 0.2995 0.8273 0.7672 0.0949 0.9717 0.5184 0.1400 0.2024 0.3667 0.7717 0.6947 0.1164
Jadenasingle 0.7630 0.6592 0.3282 0.1613 0.6092 0.6878 0.5481 0.1519 0.9795 0.4692 0.1080 0.2070 0.6622 0.6065 0.4425 0.1513
Jadenagroup 0.7672 0.6600 0.3158 0.1638 0.6441 0.6630 0.5125 0.1589 0.9873 0.4411 0.0632 0.2095 0.7156 0.5681 0.3823 0.1579
Jadenaaugment 0.7741 0.6544 0.3075 0.1630 0.6360 0.6601 0.5153 0.1586 0.9879 0.4400 0.0741 0.2096 0.7189 0.5614 0.3827 0.1590
Jedenaaugment w/o noise 0.4484 0.7657 0.6307 0.1075 0.3139 0.8154 0.7467 0.0993 0.9934 0.4119 0.0341 0.2095 0.4756 0.7192 0.6124 0.1265
Jedenaaugment w/o exposure 0.6345 0.6959 0.4627 0.1404 0.5069 0.7361 0.6235 0.1316 0.9744 0.5158 0.1367 0.2030 0.5516 0.6779 0.5530 0.1376
C
oC
A
Original 0.6680 0.5993 0.4939 0.1187 0.6062 0.5855 0.5970 0.1153 0.9606 0.3543 0.1738 0.1377 0.7259 0.4923 0.4707 0.1681
Jadenasingle 0.8046 0.5332 0.3650 0.1265 0.7660 0.4733 0.4893 0.1315 0.9737 0.3228 0.1455 0.1401 0.7954 0.4283 0.3829 0.1320
Jadenagroup 0.8340 0.5327 0.3335 0.1226 0.7915 0.4542 0.4584 0.1341 0.9876 0.2998 0.0974 0.1380 0.8355 0.3853 0.3221 0.1271
Jadenaaugment 0.8363 0.5284 0.3365 0.1224 0.7876 0.4588 0.4502 0.1347 0.9846 0.2973 0.0995 0.1392 0.8270 0.3909 0.3399 0.1284
Jedenaaugment w/o noise 0.6996 0.5852 0.4664 0.1120 0.6100 0.5737 0.5963 0.1179 0.9876 0.2833 0.0643 0.1352 0.7560 0.4571 0.4394 0.1541
Jedenaaugment w/o exposure 0.7490 0.5535 0.4310 0.1250 0.7112 0.5244 0.5536 0.1222 0.9691 0.3526 0.1672 0.1385 0.7598 0.4588 0.4428 0.1405
Table 1: Attack performance. “Orginal” means that we predict the co-saliency map of clean images using each CoSOD method.
Jadena{single, augment, group} indicates which variant of Jadena is used, and “w/o noise” or “w/o exposure” means that the attack is performed
without additive noise or exposure tuning. We highlight top results of each CoSOD method and each dataset with red.
evaluations, and then we may evaluate adversarial attacks by
observing how they change from the original performance.
The last one, success rate, aims to evaluate the ability of
an attack to make images undiscoverable. We treat an at-
tack as a success, when the IoU between the result of a
perturbed image and the corresponding ground-truth map
is less than 0.5. To calculate Success Rate, we simply di-
vide the total number of results by the number of success
result. IoU, i.e. Intersection over Union, is widely used in
tasks of object detection and visual tracking, and defined as
IoU = Aera of OverlapAera of Union . Furthermore, for measuring the quality
of perturbed images and perceptibility of the applied per-
turbations, we employ a no-reference image quality asses-
sor, i.e., BRISQUE (Mittal, Moorthy, and Bovik 2011). A
smaller BRISQUE score suggests better quality of an image.
4.2 Attack Performance & Ablation Study
We perform our method on several datasets and use four
CoSOD methods to predict result maps for the gener-
ated adversarial examples. We evaluate three variants of
our proposed attack, with different reference choice strate-
gies to build an image group around the attacked im-
age, i.e., no references, references from the same group
and augmented references of original images, denoted by
Jadena{single, group, augment}, respectively. The augmentation of
original images contains flipping, mirroring, left rotation
and right rotation, which is designed for totally black-box
attack, even without images of the same group provided. We
optimize Eq. 7 for the first variant and Eq. 8 for the other two
variants. Moreover, we perform Jedenaaugment without addi-
tive noise perturbation or exposure tuning, and report them
as Jedenaaugment w/o noise and Jedenaaugment w/o exposure.
For feature extraction required by the adversarial loss
computation, we employ a general classification model,
ResNet50 (He et al. 2016), and adopt the outputs of stage-
{1, 2, 3}. For the optimization of our proposed adversarial
loss, we use MI-FGSM and adopt µ = 1.0 for momentum
decay. For other hyperparameters of proposed method, we
set the iteration number N = 20, αn = 1 w.r.t. pixel values
in [0, 255] and maximum noise-perturbation  = 16, which
is the same with additive-perturbation-based attack in usual.
For the step size of exposure coefficients and the offset map,
we use αa = 0.1 and αU = 0.01. For smoothing the ex-
posure tuning, we use λb = 0.5 for the single variant while
λb = 0.01 for augment or group variant, λs = 0.01 and
polynomial degree D = 10, concerning both attack success
rate and imperceptibility of perturbations. We report the per-
formance results across CoSOD methods in Tab. 1.
We observe that Jedenaaugment and Jedenagroup achieve
the best performance on most metrics. Even without sam-
pling images from the same group and only with augmen-
tation of original images, Jedenaaugment may hold a competi-
tive performance with Jedenagroup for GCAGC and PoolNet,
and outperform Jedenagroup for GICD. It demonstrates that
references provided are not necessary, which may be ob-
tained by augmentation. Jedenaaugment performs better than
“w/o noise” and “w/o exposure” versions except for the
CBCD method, which suggests our proposed joint pertur-
bation plays an important role in fooling CoSOD methods.
While it is hard to handle challenging CoSOD datasets, for
the traditional method based on color histogram, i.e., CBCD,
we may also find that CBCD is much more robust to noise
than exposure tuning, since it shows a lower performance for
“w/o noise” than “w/o exposure”. In contrast to CBCD, the
other three deep methods are more sensitive to noise.
4.3 Comparison with Existing Attacks
Baselines. We consider a series of additive-perturbation-
noise attacks as baselines, i.e., FGSM (Goodfellow, Shlens,
and Szegedy 2014), I-FGSM (Kurakin, Goodfellow, and
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GICD GCAGC CBCD PoolNet
S ↑ AP ↓ Fβ ↓ MAE ↑ S ↑ AP ↓ Fβ ↓ MAE ↑ S ↑ AP ↓ Fβ ↓ MAE ↑ S ↑ AP ↓ Fβ ↓ MAE ↑
Original 0.2352 0.8595 0.7800 0.0838 0.1881 0.8960 0.8275 0.0814 0.9504 0.6046 0.1530 0.2287 0.2625 0.8449 0.7626 0.1001
Noise8 0.2238 0.8602 0.7863 0.0841 0.2074 0.8893 0.8179 0.0868 0.9464 0.6057 0.1535 0.2283 0.2655 0.8432 0.7628 0.1011
Noise16 0.2367 0.8525 0.7734 0.0886 0.2323 0.8779 0.8009 0.0950 0.9504 0.6054 0.1476 0.2289 0.2844 0.8358 0.7521 0.1048
Noise32 0.3012 0.8216 0.7310 0.1048 0.2988 0.8395 0.7519 0.1200 0.9598 0.5953 0.1376 0.2313 0.3429 0.8144 0.7078 0.1145
FGSMBCE 0.4422 * 0.7644 * 0.6366 * 0.1351 * 0.3355 0.8309 0.7315 0.1295 0.9543 0.5961 0.1503 0.2302 0.3454 0.8089 0.7043 0.1175
FGSML1 0.4561 * 0.7655 * 0.6098 * 0.1410 * 0.3300 0.8342 0.7384 0.1294 0.9573 0.5982 0.1458 0.2302 0.3524 0.8077 0.6998 0.1168
I-FGSMBCE 0.7285 * 0.6510 * 0.3970 * 0.3337 * 0.2769 0.8455 0.7644 0.1146 0.9533 0.6042 0.1491 0.2286 0.2754 0.8339 0.7503 0.1057
I-FGSML1 0.6397 * 0.6561 * 0.5134 * 0.2700 * 0.2615 0.8643 0.7801 0.1063 0.9454 0.6059 0.1533 0.2280 0.2715 0.8364 0.7533 0.1052
MI-FGSMbce 0.6700 * 0.6697 * 0.4480 * 0.2868 * 0.3975 0.7909 0.6842 0.1532 0.9514 0.5995 0.1468 0.2293 0.3375 0.8009 0.6976 0.1215
MI-FGSML1 0.5921 * 0.6541 * 0.5543 * 0.2331 * 0.3598 0.8193 0.7130 0.1355 0.9548 0.6024 0.1508 0.2294 0.3266 0.8113 0.7142 0.1180
TI-MI-FGSMBCE 0.5380 * 0.7206 * 0.5371 * 0.2112 * 0.3146 0.8197 0.7322 0.1316 0.9623 0.5648 0.1504 0.2318 0.3628 0.7894 0.6784 0.1236
TI-MI-FGSML1 0.4903 * 0.7247 * 0.6074 * 0.1789 * 0.3097 0.8378 0.7514 0.1234 0.9583 0.5677 0.1500 0.2315 0.3489 0.8050 0.6900 0.1190
Jadenasingle 0.6864 0.7044 0.3831 0.1753 0.4868 0.7682 0.6162 0.1529 0.9663 0.5490 0.1199 0.2354 0.5538 0.6985 0.5152 0.1431
Jadenagroup 0.6849 0.7069 0.3838 0.1777 0.5221 0.7453 0.5842 0.1619 0.9826 0.5212 0.0715 0.2392 0.6060 0.6671 0.4650 0.1545
Jadenaaugment 0.6893 0.7016 0.3747 0.1749 0.5146 0.7432 0.5960 0.1592 0.9816 0.5137 0.0754 0.2394 0.6010 0.6648 0.4616 0.1513
Table 2: Comparison with existing attacks. Noises apply random additive noise sampled from uniform distributionU(−, ) on each channel
of images. The attacks of FGSM and *-FGSMs are performed against co-saliency labels and have full access to the network structure and
parameters of the GICD model. *{BCE, L1} means that the adopted adversarial loss is binary cross-entropy (BCE) loss or the L1 loss. We mark
white-box attacks with star and highlight top 3 results with red, green, and blue respectively.
Bengio 2016), MI-FGSM (Dong et al. 2018), TI-MI-FGSM
(Dong et al. 2019). For the hyperparameters of baselines, we
set the max perturbation  = 16 with pixel values in [0, 255]
respectively, as well as iteration number N = 20, step size
αn = 1 for iteration attacks, momentum decay µ = 1.0
for momentum methods, and Gaussian kernel length to be
15 for TI-MI-FGSM. Since no specific attacks for CoSOD
methods were proposed, we follow a general white-box at-
tack manner and employ L1 norm and binary cross-entropy
(BCE) as adversarial losses.
Attack comparison. We launch baselines and our method
on Cosal2015 dataset. The hyperparameters of our method
follow Sec. 4.2. The comparison results are shown in Tab. 2.
Compared with existing additive-perturbation-based at-
tacks, our proposed Jedena outperforms all of them except
for white-box attacks, which suggests better transferability
of our method than baselines. Since we only borrow several
shallow layers from the deep classification model, our pro-
posed method needs less computation cost than an iterative
attack method with a result-based adversarial loss, which un-
avoidably back-propagates gradients through the whole deep
model.
Image quality comparison. We also evaluate the image
quality of generated adversarial examples and investigate
how distortion degree affects the attack performance. For
each attack method, we plot a line to describe the Success
Rate vs. BRISQUE in Fig. 3 by changing the maximum
noise perturbation n and λb for our method as well. We
also show some cases to visualize how attack method per-
turb an image in Fig. 4. For baselines attacks, we follow
the default settings of the above section, but only use the
BCE loss since it usually has a better performance than L1
loss. For our method, we adopt the variant of “augment”, i.e.,
Jadenaaugment, which is practical and convenient to perform
in a real-world scenery.
We have three findings: ¶ compared with white-box at-
tacks for GICD, our method has a competitive performance
with MI-FGSM, and outperforms FGSM. · when trans-
ferred to GCAGC and PoolNet, our method outperforms
most additive-perturbation-based methods except for TI-MI-
FGSM. Especially for PoolNet a single saliency detector,
our method shows significant advantages beyond FGSM,
I-FGSM and MI-FGSM, which is reasonable for them be-
ing adversarial against a CoSOD method and showing lower
transferability for a SOD method than our proposed black-
box attack. ¸ we also notice that TI-MI-FGSM applies
coarse-graining and local smoothing noises on images un-
like ordinary noises as shown in the last row of Fig. 4, which
looks unnatural for human, but fools BRISQUE measure.
5 Conclusions
In this work, we have investigated a novel problem: how to
effectively protect personal-sensitive image contents from
being extracted or discovered by the state-of-the-art co-
saliency object detection methods. We have addressed this
problem from the perspective of adversarial attack and iden-
tified a novel task, i.e., adversarial co-saliency attack that
aims at tackling the following scenarios: given an image se-
lected from an image group containing some common and
salient objects, how to generate an adversarial version of
the image that can mislead CoSOD methods to predict in-
correct co-salient regions, thus evading the co-saliency de-
tection and making the images undiscoverable by the co-
saliency detection algorithms. We have proposed the very
first blackbox joint adversarial exposure & noise attack
(Jadena) where we jointly and locally tune the exposure
and additive perturbations of the image according to a newly
designed high-feature-level contrast-sensitive loss function.
Our method, without needing any information of the state-
of-the-art CoSOD methods, leads to significant performance
degradation on various co-saliency detection datasets and
makes the co-salient objects undetectable. The effectiveness
of the proposed method is thoroughly validated and show-
cased through various quantitative and qualitative experi-
ments. We believe that the proposed method can greatly
6
Figure 3: Success Rate vs. BRISQUE. This figure shows the change in success rate of attacks with the distortion degree. A larger BRISQUE
suggests a worse quality of images, i.e., more distortion. The performance of our method is plotted in red.
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Figure 4: Visualization of attack results. We show two cases from Cosal2015 dataset in this figure. We visualize the image, the ground-truth
of co-saliency map and results of GICD, GCAGC and PoolNet along columns, and show the images perturbed by Jadena, FGSM, I-FGSM,
MI-FGSM, TI-MI-FGSM and corresponding results, besides the original ones, for each row. We highlight our method in green.
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Figure I: More visualization results from Cosal2015. We visualize the image, the ground-truth of co-saliency map and results of GICD,
GCAGC and PoolNet along columns, and show the original images and images perturbed by Jadena, baselines followed by corresponding
results for each row. We highlight our method in green.
benefit the design and execution of privacy-oriented content
sharing on the public domain where malicious extractions
can be effectively inhibited.
In future work, we would like to further extend the pro-
posed Jadena to a more broad range of applications, such as
object segmentation (Guo et al. 2018, 2017c) and visual ob-
ject tracking (Guo et al. 2020a,c, 2017a; Chen et al. 2018;
Guo et al. 2017b). Moreover, we will use our adversarial ex-
posure attack as a new kind of mutation for DNN testing
(Xie et al. 2019a; Du et al. 2019; Xie et al. 2019b; Ma et al.
2018). Not being a traditional noise-based adversarial attack,
it is quite worthwhile to investigate the interplay between the
proposed Jadena and other non-additive-noise based attack
modes such as (Zhai et al. 2020; Guo et al. 2020c; Wang
et al. 2020; Guo et al. 2020b; Cheng et al. 2020).
Appendix
In this appendix, we present more visualization results of
baselines and our attack method across CoSOD methods, to
demonstrate the advantages of ours over baselines.
We show more visualization results of cases from
Cosal2015 (Zhang et al. 2016) in Figs. I and II, and ones
from CoSOD3k (Fan et al. 2020) in Figs. III and IV. All
hyperparameter settings and the layout keep the same with
Fig. 4 of the main paper.
We may observe adversarial examples generated by our
proposed method hold more transferability across CoSOD
methods, without perceptible perturbation. Moreover, visu-
alization results validate the joint perturbations play an im-
portant role in fooling CoSOD methods, since our method
with joint perturbations outperforms “w/o noise” and “w/o
exposure” versions. We can also notice that TI-MI-FGSM
applies unnatural noise, which is more perceptible than any
other noise-based attacks.
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